This paper investigates whether small business groups (SBGs
Introduction
Under perfect market conditions, individual actors satisfy their needs through exchange. If so, why do firms exist at all (Coase, 1937) ? Proposing the parallel that the firm is to individual agent as business group (BG) is to firm, Granovetter (1995) moves this issue a step further and asks why BGs exist. The extensive literature on the benefits and costs of BGs focuses on BG ability to reallocate capital within group firms, through their internal capital market (ICM). The empirical literature shows that large firm BG affiliation is beneficial in emerging economies where market imperfections are severe, but is inefficient in developed economies (see Table 1 ). Overall, empirical results support the hypothesis that BGs are rational institutional arrangements in which internal markets replace imperfect external markets to allocate resources (Leff 1976 (Leff , 1978 Kock and Guillén, 2001 ). This paper explores this hypothesis in the specific context of small business groups (SBGs). An SBG bonds together small businesses that are controlled by one of the constituent small businesses, and SBG economic weight is equivalent to that of a small and medium enterprise (SME). Recent evidence suggests that small business groupings are an emerging phenomenon. In France, the number of SMEs affiliated with an SBG has doubled over the last decade and SBG affiliation includes one-third of French SMEs (Cayssials et al., 2007) . Small businesses suffer from important imperfections with respect to the market, especially from information imperfections. Informational opacity limits SME access to external finance (Berger et al., 2001; Beck et al., 2006) , which undermine their growth. Thus, SMEs can adopt a specific organizational strategy to favor their development. Affiliation with a BG can be beneficial for SME development because ICMs allow for a more efficient allocation of capital. Indeed, BG controlling firms have two advantages, relative to other intermediaries, in allocating capital to affiliated firms. They possess an informational advantage and are able to effect changes in strategy with lower transaction costs. Further, by combining cash flows, BGs can reduce the volatility of firm revenues (mutual insurance). This reduced risk favors investment and reduces the variability of financial indicators, which improves BG external financing capacity relative to standalone firms. This paper explores whether formation of an SBG is an organizational strategy that promotes growth. To identify SBGs, we use a unique dataset that exhaustively lists ownership links between French corporations. Classically, we observe the influence of SBG affiliation on firm growth using a firm-level sample. This sample contains complete accounting information for 24 522 SMEs, which are either independent or affiliated with an SBG, over the period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . In an original manner, we also compare the growth of SBGs to that of standalone firms. Indeed, affiliation with an SBG can favor affiliated-firm growth without leading to overall growth in the SBG. The group-level sample contains 2 799 SBGs for which we are able to compute group aggregate data and 2 799 matched standalone firms. Further, we explore through which channels SBGs promote growth. First, we test whether SBG ICMs are efficient, by observing the effect of SBG affiliation on firm performance. Second, we test whether SBGs operate mutual insurance between group firms. We explore the influence of SBG affiliation and group status on firm operating risk and capital structure. Finally, we establish a typology of SBGs according to their diversification strategies and test whether SBG characteristics affect the results.
Our results show that grouping small businesses is an organizational strategy that favors SME growth: SBGs promote affiliated-firm dynamism and SBGs invest more than their standalone counterparts. The results further show affiliation to a SBG is beneficial for firm profitability and that there is no over-investment in SBGs. Overall, the results support that SBGs ICM are more efficient in allocating capital than external markets. Finally, accounting for SBG diversification strategies does not affect the results. Nevertheless, we observe that geographically diversified SBGs underperform relative to other SBGs, whereas we find no evidence of a diversification discount in SBGs.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology. In Section 4 we discuss the results. Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions.
Literature review and hypothesis development
The literature in finance and economics on the costs and benefits of BGs focuses on four aspects. A first line of research regards BGs as a setting for the study of conflicts of interest between controlling and minority shareholders (Betrand et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2002) .
A second line of research regards BGs as socially counterproductive organizations. In this view, BGs serve as a mechanism through which a subset of firms obtains favorable treatment from authorities. Such a condition limits competition, which undermines the economy's allocation efficiency (Khanna, 2000) . The empirical evidence on this topic is scarce and contradictory (Fisman, 2001; Manos et al., 2007) . A third line of research suggests that a BG is a mechanism to increase market power. By horizontally integrating, BGs achieve the benefits of multi-market contact (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990) . By vertically integrating, upstream and downstream producers avoid double marginalization and increase their joint profits (Spengler, 1950) . However, empirical evidence does not support that BGs increase market power. Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) report that Keireitsu members appear to compete quite fiercely. Encoua and Jacquemin (1982) show that cartelization does not result from the formation of BGs in France.
The main stream of research focuses on the costs and benefits of internal markets. In presence of market imperfections, BGs have three main roles: BGs can be a solution to replace imperfect product and labor markets. Second, BGs can foster development by replacing defaulting public infrastructures (Fisman and Khanna, 2004) . Finally, BGs pool and reallocate capital within group firms; the discussion focuses on this latter role. In a BG, the controlling firm redistributes financial resources away from some affiliates and redirects them to others through internal transfers. 1 Thus, BG controlling firm allocation decisions endogenously determine affiliated-firm wealth. Group firm performance is sensitive to BG resources (Chang and Hong, 2002; Bertrand et al., 2002) . First, we review the literature on the efficiency of ICM capital budgeting policy (2.1). Second, we review the literature on the use of ICM for mutual risk insurance between group firms (2.2). Finally, we review the literature on the influence of BG characteristics on the efficiency of capital allocation (2.3).
Capital allocation efficiency in BGs
Markets imperfections can impair the efficiency of financial markets; in this context, ICMs may improve the allocation of financial resources. According to Alchian (1969) and Williamson (1975) , BG controlling firms 2 improve capital allocation efficiency, compared to other types of intermediaries, because of their higher information production. BG controlling firms have access to private information on group firms, which increases their ability to assess the quality of projects, reducing adverse selection issues. Moreover, controlling firms differ from banks because they hold the residual control rights on group-firm assets. Control rights both reduce monitoring costs and give to controlling firms the authority to redeploy the assets of projects that are performing poorly under existing management (Gertner et al. 1994) . Given their specificities, controlling firms are more prone to operate on the basis of "winner picking" (Stein, 1997) . Winner picking implies that resources are allocated to the bestperforming group firms, which improves capital allocation. However, inefficient crosssubsidization can undermine the efficiency of capital allocation in BGs. Inefficient crosssubsidization occurs when there is over-investment in poorly performing BG firms and underinvestment in highly performing ones. According to Meyer et al. (1992) , failing businesses create more value loss as part of a BG than as standalone firms. Whereas a failing business cannot have a value below zero if operated on its own, it can have a negative value if it is part of a BG that provides cross-subsidies. According to the literature on large BGs, inefficient cross-subsidies result from empire building (Jensen, 1986) , evaluation problems (Stein, 1997) , rent seeking behavior of top management (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) , and expropriation of minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000) .
There are two approaches to evaluate empirically the efficiency of capital allocation in conglomerates or BGs. A majority of empirical work, follows the approach of Berger and Ofek (1995) , who compare the performance of an affiliated firm with a standalone counterpart. Other studies observe whether affiliated-firm investment sensitivity to BG cash flow depends on firm investment project quality, following the approach of Shin and Stulz (1998) . Table 1 summarizes the mixed empirical evidence on ICM efficiency. ICMs tend to increase affiliated-firm performance in emergent countries, whereas in developed countries BG affiliation has systematically a negative influence on affiliated-firms performance. The papers using the Shin and Stulz (1998) approach generally observe that affiliated-firm performance does not explain firm investment sensitivity to BG cash flows. This observation contradicts the hypothesis of ICM capital-allocation efficiency. Overall, the empirical evidence is consistent with the view that ICMs are a second-best option in the presence of market imperfections (Leff, 1978) . Given that small businesses suffer from informational opacity, which limits their access to external financing (Berger et al., 2001) , we expect group affiliation to be beneficial for small businesses. SBG ICMs might be more efficient in allocating capital to SMEs than external investors, because of their greater access to information and ability to redeploy assets.
Mutual insurance among BG firms
BGs can also promote growth if they provide mutual insurance between group firms.
Mutual insurance reduces BG cash flow volatility and default risk, which ultimately increases BG-firm financing capacity.
Via the ICM, controlling firms have the ability to affect the allocation of risk. BG firms can combine their cash flows to reduce the volatility of group-firm revenue. BGs can also use cross-subsidies to redistribute cash flow to weak affiliates, which provides them with implicit insurance against bankruptcy (Riyanto and Toolsema, 2008) . Indeed, within the group, the short-run profits of some firms may be sacrificed in order to allow weaker, but potentially profitable firms, to survive through economic slowdowns and external shocks. Mutual insurance among BG firms has several benefits. It limits firm under-investment, because mutual insurance stabilizes financially constrained firms' cash flow (Froot et al., 1993) .
Mutual insurance among BG firms can be an alternative to imperfect stock markets to achieve risk sharing. Kali (2003) theoretically demonstrates that BGs favor the development of economies by allowing entrepreneurs to choose highly productive though risky technology, when stock markets are inefficient or non-existent. Cross-subsidies to support the weaker BG firms reduce the risk of liquidation by banks (Kim, 2004) . Mutual insurance between group firms reduces idiosyncratic shocks on financial indicators, which increases BG firms' external financing capacity (Shamphantharak, 2007) . Moreover, the intra-group debt guarantee increases group firm debt capacity (Chang and Hong, 2000) . Affiliated firms can also benefit from the BG's reputation to improve bank perceptions (Shiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000) .
Finally, the Ghatak and Kali (2001) model suggests that BGs alleviate asymmetric information issues. These authors show that correlation among the costs of borrowing across group members mitigates credit rationing. Table 2 summarizes the results of empirical studies that test these issues. A first set of studies observes the influence of group affiliation on the variance of firm performance.
Results generally support the notion that BG firms have a lower volatility of profitability than independent firms, with the exception of Buysschaert et al. (2008) in Belgium and Khanna and Yafeh (2005) in India. Other studies test the effect of BG affiliation on firm default risk; they observe whether BG affiliation influences firm default probability. These papers observe that group affiliation reduces firms' probability of default. Alternatively, some studies investigate the issue of propping in BGs. Propping is a transfer from higher-level to lowerlevel firms in the control chain, which is intended to bail out the receiving firm from bankruptcy (Friedman et al., 2003) . The studies show that controlling firms transfer resources to support distressed affiliated firms, which is consistent with the propping hypothesis.
Finally, papers that investigate whether BG affiliation increases firm access to external financing compare investment-cash flow sensitivities or target leverage levels between affiliated and standalone firms. The results show that group affiliation increases firm use of debt financing, particularly for the smallest firms (Gorodnichenko et al., 2009) . Consistently with the empirical evidence, we expect that if SBGs realize mutual insurance among group firms, they will be less risky and have higher leverage levels than standalone firms.
The effect of group characteristics on the efficiency of the ICM
Another related body of literature focuses on how BG characteristics influence affiliatedfirm performance. This literature arises from observation of a diversification discount in diversified conglomerates in the US (Berger and Ofek, 1995) . Another set of empirical papers explores the influence of the characteristics of the controlling firm (banks and holding companies) on the performance effect of BG affiliation.
The literature distinguishes four types of diversification. Vertical integration involves merging a potential supplier and a customer into common ownership, thus bypassing market
transactions. An important gain from vertical integration is avoiding market transaction costs.
In particular, vertical integration mitigates under-investment related to the hold-up problem (Williamson, 1985) or contractual incompleteness issues (Grossman and Hart, 1986 ) when assets are specific. Vertical integration may also prove efficient when the market fails to provide a full set of hedging instruments (Chao et al., 2005 a,b; Aïd et al., 2009 ). However, vertical integration might be value decreasing, as it requires more complex coordination in technology, management, production and capital investment. Related diversification involves merging businesses with overlapping input or output markets. This allows businesses to employ common resources such as technology, plants, brand names, distribution systems, or reputation. If such resources exhibit scale or scope economies in ways that cannot be effectively exploited though market transactions or relational contracts, it may be efficient to pool different businesses into groups to capitalize on those economies (Teece, 1980 (Teece, , 1982 .
Unrelated diversification merges businesses that operate in different industries and with no a priori synergies. Unrelated diversification can be beneficial, because product diversification reduces BG risk. However, unrelated diversification can adversely affect the efficiency of capital allocation in BGs. Given that BGs controlling firms observe investment with noise, the efficiency of capital allocation across group firms depends on the correlation between investment opportunities. Therefore, unrelated diversification reduces ICM efficiency, whereas in related industries the observation noises are correlated, which facilitates winner picking (Stein, 1997) . Finally, geographic diversification consists of creating subsidiaries in different geographic areas. The literature exploring geographic diversification is scarce and generally focuses on internationalization rather than on local geographic diversification.
Geographic diversification may add value because it allows exploitation of market opportunities and reduces risk across markets. However, geographic diversification might also destroy value, because it posits complex coordination problems across multiple geographic markets, which reduces the ability to derive the benefits of economies of scale and scope (Hymer, 1970; Rugman; 1977; Denis et al., 2002) . The empirical evidence on the influence of diversification strategies on affiliated-firm performance generally indicates that unrelated diversification has a negative effect on affiliated-firm performance and on ICM efficiency (see Table 3 ). The only exception is Khanna and Palepu (2000) , who observe a non-linear effect of product diversification on affiliated-firm performance in emerging countries. These authors show that low levels of diversification have a negative effect, whereas high levels of diversification have a positive effect on affiliated-firm performance. Empirical studies further suggest that related or geographic diversification is favorable for affiliated-firm performance. Claessens et al. (2003) find no effect of vertical integration on conglomerate-division performance in East Asia.
Finally, Gautier and Hamadi (2005) and Perotti and Gelfer (2001) show that the performance effect of BG affiliation depends on the characteristics of the BG controlling firm. Their results point out that the presence of a financial controlling firm enhances the performance of affiliated firms. They attribute this result to the fact that a financial controlling firm facilitates BG access to the external financing available to the group. Therefore, we expect SBG characteristics to mitigate the efficiency and mutual insurance effects of BGs. In particular, unrelated diversification should negatively affect SBG performance.
Data and methodology
The sample used in this study comes from two databases; we merge the information thanks to each firm's unique fiscal identifier (SIREN 
SBG definition and identification
An SBG is a BG whose economic weight is equivalent to that of an SME. The initial database on ownership links between firms does not identify groups, but only direct and indirect ownership links between firms. First, we identify BGs according to the criterion of majority control. Then, we identify SBGs according to the SME definition of the European Commission.
A BG is an ownership structure in which the controlling firm controls several firms through a control chain (Bianchi et al. 1997) . A control chain is a chain of control relationships between firms. 3 A firm directly controls another firm whenever that firm has a particular minimum level of ownership in another firm. A firm indirectly controls another firm whenever that firm owns a particular minimum ownership-stake threshold in a third firm that owns an ownership-stake threshold in the controlled firm. Although the literature agrees on the fact that the ownership threshold must maximize the probability of identifying a unique controlling shareholder, it disagrees upon the threshold of ownership to adopt. Studies on large BGs often adopt a threshold of 20% of direct ownership at each level of the control chain to establish control (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio et al., 2001; Claessens et al., 2002) .
However, in weakly dispersed ownership structures, several large shareholders might arise who are able to form coalitions and contest the control of the dominant shareholder (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000) . As a result, the use of a 20% threshold is criticized for European firms and for private firms where ownership concentration is high (Reneboog, 2000 and Biebuyck et al., 2005) . Moreover, a control threshold of 50% avoids counterintuitive results such as the existence of two controlling shareholders. Accordingly, we adopt the criterion of majority control 4 to identify BGs . 5 A BG corresponds to a chain of majority-control relationships: the ultimate shareholder effectively controls a firm (with direct cash flow rights larger than 50%) that in turn effectively controls another firm, and so on. Finally, we distinguish between three types of firm. Controlling firms are the BG's ultimate shareholder. Controlled firms are affiliated to a BG but are not the ultimate shareholder. In independent firms, no outside firm holds more than 50%
ownership.
This study focuses on SBGs whose economic weight is equivalent to that of an SME. In order to implement this size criterion, we use the European Commission 6 SME definition. The EU definition classically includes size thresholds to define the size perimeters of SMEs. This size threshold is expressed in terms of turnover (< 50 M€), total assets (< 43 M€), and workforce (< 250 full-time employees). The EU definition also integrates the notion of economic dependence via the notion of autonomy. When a firm holds capital participations in other firms higher than 50% or when another firm holds a participation higher than 50% in that firm, then the firm is a linked enterprise. Linked firms need to aggregate their accounting data to determine if they correspond to an SME. We use the same methodology to determine BG size. The use of workforce information is difficult because is it not well described in the database and is biased by the use of external workforces. Therefore, to compute group size we aggregate BG firm turnover for 2005. We exclude identified BGs for which turnover information is lacking for one or more group firms and for which aggregate turnover is higher than 50M€. Overall, the final sample includes 15 877 SBGs.
SBG characteristics
SBGs, that we identified in the database, have on average a turnover of 9,8M€, but half of SBGs have a turnover less than 6M€ (see Table 4 ). Average values for the number of firms and levels indicate that the SBG control structure is generally quite simple; consisting of a controlling firm that controls directly two firms.
Given that BG characteristics influence the performance effect of BGs (see 2.3) we develop a typology of SBGs. First, we identify whether a holding company is the SBG controlling firm. The variable holding takes the value 1 when a holding firm controls the SBG, zero otherwise. Second, we develop several indicators of SBG diversification, departing from group-firm geographic and industry location. We first compute the number of "departments" 7 (NDEP) and industries (NIND) in each SBG. 8 The variable related takes the value 1 when there is no diversification in the SBG (both NDEP and NIND are equal to 1).
Then, we classify diversified firms based on the type of diversification they embody. The variable geo is equal to 1 when SBG diversification is only a geographic diversification (NIND=1 and NDEP>1), and zero otherwise. Finally, unrelated takes the value 1 whenever the SBG is industrially diversified with no vertical relationship between group firms (NIND>1 and vertical=0). Table 4 reports the characteristics of the 15 877 SBGs identified in the database. Panel A of Table 4 shows that, on average, SBG firms are located in 2,4 industries and 1,8
"departments", and that 10,42% of SBGs are controlled by a holding company. Some 32% of SBGs are not diversified, whereas 68% are geographically or industrially diversified.
Diversified SBGs are larger, have more complex control structures (a higher number of levels), and are more often controlled by a holding firm. Panel B of Table 4 shows that the majority of diversified SBGs adopt a strategy of industrial diversification (94%), whereas only 6% of diversified SBGs adopt a strategy of pure geographic diversification. The type of diversification influences SBG size and complexity: SBGs with only geographic diversification are smaller and have fewer levels, but are more often controlled by a holding firm. 
Methodology
Following common practice, we use regression analysis to test our hypotheses. We test the hypotheses on the firm-level sample (3.3.1), and on the group-level sample (3.3.2).
Firm-level tests
In order to test whether affiliation with an SBG enhances small-business growth, we estimate equation 1 β should be negative.
Group-level tests
Further, we estimate equations 1 to 3 for a matched sample of standalone companies and SBGs. 13 With the exception of Kakani (2000) , this approach is not developed in the literature on BGs. However, we think it could provide interesting insights into SBG performance effect.
First, it is difficult to derive conclusions on the global effect of SBGs on performance from estimations of the effects of SBG affiliation. Indeed, such an approach implicitly assumes that affiliated firms have similar relative importance in SBGs. Therefore, this approach could be misleading if the effect of affiliation on performance is driven by the fact that a very small affiliated firm has a high level of performance. Moreover, this approach also accounts for the fact that a BG with synergies would have an asymmetric influence on returns of all affiliate members, if the synergies do not assist all businesses in the group equally (Brush and Bromiley, 1997 
Sample construction and descriptive statistics
In order to elaborate the study sample, we merge the ownership information with the Diane database. Following common practice, we exclude observations for which we do not have the required information and with incoherent balance sheet information (such as negative total assets). Moreover, we exclude observations for which we do not have at least two consecutive years of information with which to compute growth rates. Using these criteria, we end up with a firm-level sample of 13 651 firms affiliated with SBGs and 10 869 independent firms for which we have all relevant information over the period 1999-2007. 15 We use a matching methodology for the group-level sample to control for the potential bias resulting from the fact that SBGs tend to be bigger than standalone firms in our sample. 16 To obtain SBG industry, we compute the firm's weight in the SBG. This weight is the ratio of firm turnover to group turnover. Then, we add weights by industry, and attribute to the SBG that industry that has the highest weight.
SMEs and 2 799 SBGs. Observations comprise medium-sized businesses, average turnover 13,1M€, and mature firms (see Table 6 ). Logically, there are no differences between the two subsamples according to size and age as we match samples on this criterion. Sales growth rate is 15%, investment rate is 12% and firm operating performance is 11%. Mean comparisons indicate that SBGs invest more, are more profitable and have similar levels of operating risk and external financial leverage as standalone firms.
Results
This section reports results on the effect of affiliation with an SBG on small-business growth, profitability, and risk (4.1). Then, we present results on whether the formation of an SBG is an organizational strategy that enhances growth (4.2). Finally, we present results on the effect of SBG characteristics on their performance and risk (4.3). Table 7 reports results on the influence of firm affiliation with an SBG on firm investment rate, ROA and risk. Column 1 shows that affiliation with an SBG has a positive influence on firm investment rate. The investment rate of firms affiliated with an SBG is, on average, 2,5%
Does affiliation to a SBG favors small businesses growth?
higher than that of standalone firms. The results in Column 1 support the fact that affiliation with an SBG promotes small business growth. Column 2 shows that affiliation with an SBG positively influences firm operating profitability. This result supports that SBG ICMs are efficient. Finally, Column 3 indicates that affiliation with an SBG slightly increases firm operating risk. There is apparently no evidence of mutual insurance within SBGs; crosssubsidies do not seem to be used to reduce affiliated-firm risk.
Columns 1 to 3 report estimates of the coefficients when estimating equation 1 to 3, using the ordinary least square method, on the firm-level sample Investment rate is the firm growth of capital invested. ROA is the firm ratio of EBITDA on total assets. Operating risk is the firm standard deviation of ROA. Affiliated is equal to one when the firm is affiliated to a SBG, and to zero when it is a standalone firm. Size is the log of the firm total assets minus financial assets. Age is the number of years since firm creation. All financial variables are average values over the study period. The standard errors of estimates are reported in italics under the value of the estimated coefficients. *** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% level according to the -test, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 1% level. Intriguingly results show a negative relationship between firm risk and firm profitability. Although this is quite surprising it has been observed in previous studies of the same type (see for example Buyssachet et al., 2008) . This result can be explained by the fact that we do not rely on market data but on accounting data in which firm profitability is the effective firm profitability, whereas shares market values also account for the expectations of the market. This paper does not focus on this issue, however future research on the reasons to this puzzle could be very interesting.
The literature reports a negative influence of BG affiliation on firm performance in developed countries (see Table 1 ). Consistently with Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) , who find that affiliation with a BG is beneficial for the smallest businesses, we show that affiliation with an SBG is also a mechanism that enhances capital allocation in small businesses.
Overall, the results suggest that SBG affiliation promotes small business growth. SBG controlling firms do better in allocating capital to small businesses than external financiers.
These results are consistent with the argument that ICMs are a second-best solution in the presence of market imperfections, in the case of this study of information imperfections.
4.2
Is grouping small businesses an organizational strategy that enhances SME growth? Table 8 reports estimations of equations 1 to 3 on the matched samples of SBG aggregate data and standalone firms. Column 1 indicates that SBGs are significantly more dynamic than standalone firms. The economic significance of the coefficient in front of the group variable is high. The investment rate of SBGs is, on average, 6,4% higher than that of standalone firms.
The results, in Column 1, clearly support that grouping small businesses, in comparison with organic growth, is an organizational strategy that enhances small business dynamism. Column 2 shows that the benefits of grouping small businesses in terms of operating profitability is rather small. However, the positive, although small, effect of SBGs on operating profitability confirms that there is no over-investment in SBGs. Column 3 shows that, on average, SBGs and standalone firms have similar levels of operating risk. This result supports that SBGs do not operate mutual insurance between group firms, but do locate risk in affiliated firms.
Indeed, the risk of SBGs is smaller than that of SBG-affiliated firms, which suggests specific risk allocation patterns in SBGs. Columns 1 to 4 report estimates of the coefficients when estimating equation 1 to 3, using ordinary least square method, on the matched sample of SBGs and standalone firms. Investment rate is the entity growth of capital invested. ROA is the entity ratio of EBITDA on total assets. Operating risk is the entity standard deviation of ROA. Financial Leverage is the entity ratio of financial debt on equity. Size is the log of the entity total assets minus financial assets. Age is the number of years since entity creation. All financial values are average values over the study period. The standard errors of estimates are reported in italics under the value of the estimated coefficients. *** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% level according to the t-test, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
Group
Operating Risk Investment Rate ROA Overall, the results in Table 8 show that grouping small businesses is an organizational strategy that promotes growth. The results support that SBG ICMs are efficient, which increases their internal financing capacity, and ultimately their capacity to invest. Several alternative explanations can also explain why SBGs are more dynamic than standalone firms.
First, structuring control in a BG permits it to raise external capital while maintaining control.
If small business owners value control, creating an SBG reduces the cost of opening up firm capital to external investors. Second, the higher dynamism and performance of SBG-affiliated firms can enhance their ability to attract external capital. Finally, SBGs possess an option of partial liquidation, which reduces bankruptcy costs (Bianco and Nicodano, 2002) . Unlike conglomerates, BGs are not legally obliged to bail out affiliated firms, because group firms are legally distinct. This "fractioning of liability" has several advantages. Controlling firms may choose to concentrate the bankruptcy risk in a group firm, by concentrating the external debt in this firm. However, such strategy might be costly if creditors anticipate this expropriation. Moreover, controlling shareholders can secure assets in one firm, and concentrate business risk in other group firms. Indeed, if the riskier firm goes bankrupt, the controlling shareholder still controls the assets necessary to continue production. Such strategy then reduces SBG controlling shareholder wealth exposure to business risk, which increases its incentive to invest (this issue is explored in details in Hamelin, 2011) . Overall, the results in Table 9 confirm that SBG affiliation and grouping small businesses promote growth and that there is no mutual insurance within SBGs. Further, the results do not support the diversification discount hypothesis in SBGs; the less efficient strategy is geographic diversification. Finally, the results indicate that the type of controlling firm does influence SBG performance effect. The presence of a holding company in the SBG enhances affiliated firms and SBGs growth; this might be explained by the fact that holding companies benefit from higher levels of leverage given that they are generally created by leveraged buyout. The results in Table 9 confirm that the characteristics of SBGs influence their growth, profitability and risk. However, the effect of group characteristics does not undermine the performance effect of SBGs.
Effect of SBG characteristics on performance and risk

Conclusion
This study explores whether formation of an SBG acts as an organizational strategy that promotes SME growth. This paper presents original results on the effect of firm affiliation on 
Appendices
Appendix A: Example of a BG identified in the initial database
Figure 1: Example of ownership links between firms
In the ownership structure represented in Figure 1 , firm A has an ownership stake of 90%*60%=48% in firm D. However, A majority controls 19 firm C, which in turn majority controls firm D; thus A controls D. Firm A also controls firm B, given that it direct stake is higher than 50%. Firms F and E are independent firms because they neither are directly controlled at a majority by another firm or directly control at a majority another firm. Overall, the business group is formed by firms A, B, C and D. 19 The term majority control is used to describe the situation in which a firm controls another firm through holding a majority (>50%) of the controlled firm's shares. Number of links (n): the number of firms that have an ownership stake in the firm.
We fill in the ownership structure illustrated in Figure 1 in Table 10 : Whenever the shareholder's ownership stake is greater than 50%, we assume that control is total. In turn, we assume that other shareholders have no effective control. This criterion seems optimal for this study. Indeed, the sample concerns privately held firms where ownership is often highly concentrated, yet this threshold avoids the counterintuitive findings for situations involving two controlling firms.
First, in order to identify the control chains and establish whether control is effective at each chain's link, we identify the ultimate holding level for each controlled firm. We create a variable N that indicates the higher holding level for each of the controlled firms in the initial database. The highest level of holding found in the database is 17. Contrary to the level variable that characterizes the relation of a controlled firm with a controlling firm, the N variable is unique for each controlled firm and indicates the higher level at which the firm is held.
Second, a binary variable indicates whether a firm is subject to direct effective control from the firm holding it directly. The majoritization rule is applied using the ownership (o) variable when level=1 to obtain the effective control (ec) variable, which takes the value 1 if direct ownership of the firm is higher than 50%, and 0 otherwise. Third, the effective control level (S) is the highest level at which the firm is effectively controlled all along the chain of control. In order to identify the effective control level of firms in the database, the procedure starts from the lowest level of control and goes up along the control chain in order to observe whether there is a control rupture. The level at which this occurs returns the value of S.
Fourth, we identify the controlling firm (ActS) at level S. When N is greater than 2, a procedure of N steps is required. We first identify whether the firm is effectively controlled at level 1, and then whether the controlling firm at level 1 (Act1) is effectively controlled, and so on, using the effective control variable (c) that returns the direct ownership between two firms. These transformations modify the structure of the database, as the observations are the controlled firms, and not every pair of controlled/controlling firms as illustrated in Table 11 .
Next, the table reports that vertical control chains are the observations and the variables indicate the chain of control. One fact not captured in the example below is that the database also contains the information on direct ownership between firms at each level DS. We need a transformation to identify groups. The aim of this transformation is to make the BGs the observations instead of the vertical chains of control. We index each controlled firm by both its level of control (l) and the horizontal branches through which it belongs to (b).
This allows us to obtain the following group-level variables. Level indicates the length of the vertical control chain in the BG. Nbfirms is a variable indicating the number of firms in the BG, including the controlling firm. Branches provides information regarding the geometry of the group by indicating the number of horizontal chains in the BG. If this variable is equal to 1, the BG is a vertical chain of control. If it is greater than 1, the BG is a mix between a horizontal and vertical control chain, which is the case of the example BG below. Aggregate of group firms size. Industry that represents the highest level of tunrover in the SBG.
Number of departments in the SBG.
Technological
Size Industry Age Age of SBG controlling firm.
Holding
Is equal to 1 if SBG controlling firm is a holding, and 0 else.
Diversified
Is equal to 1 if either NDEP>1 or NIND>1, and 0 else.
NIND
Group Level variables
Characteritistics
NDEP
Geo
Vertical
Number of industries in the SBG.
Is equal to 1 if NDEP>1 and NIND=1, and 0 else.
Is equal to 1 is bacward is equal to 1 or 0, and 0 else. Average growth rate of productive assets. Where productive assets is the sum of gross long-term assets and working capital minus financial assets.
Risk
ROA volatility
Standard deviation of ROA over the period. Average annual growth rates of sales
